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Abstract 
 
This paper sets out to explain the preferences of the seven northern euro area member states 
on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) concerning the threshold set for direct European 
Central Bank control over bank supervision. Building on the concept of the ‘financial 
trilemma’, we argue that different bank internationalization patterns in the seven northern 
member states explain different preferences on the transfer of supervisory powers over less 
significant banks to the ECB. In particular, the reach of internationalization into a national 
banking system — notably the extent to which even smaller banks were exposed to foreign 
banking operations — is shown to be the core factor explaining different national preferences 
on threshold. In the five countries with a large number of small and parochial alternative 
(cooperative and savings) banks, it is necessary to examine the system-specific structures of 
these banks to explain better the reach of internationalization and national preferences on the 
threshold. Determined German opposition to ECB supervision of smaller alternative banks is 
juxtaposed with either less hostile or more positive support of at least four other countries 
despite the important presence of small alternative banks. 
 
Keywords: Banking Union, Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM, banking supervision, 
banking system, Economic and Monetary Union 
 
Introduction 
 
In June 2012, the European Council agreed to deepen Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
by creating ‘Banking Union’ (BU), which was to be based on four components:  a single 
framework for banking supervision; a single framework for the managed resolution of banks 
and financial institutions; a common deposit guarantee scheme; and a common backstop for 
temporary financial support. The proposals for BU amounted to a radical initiative to rebuild 
financial market confidence in both banks and sovereigns — especially in the euro area 
periphery — to stabilise the national banking systems exposed directly to a vicious circle 
between the international financial crisis and the euro area’s sovereign debt crisis (see Hall 
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2014; Hansen et al. 2014; Mourlon-Druol 2014) and to reverse the fragmentation of European 
financial markets. BU was also to bring about a significant transfer of powers from the 
national to the EU (to be precise, the BU) level.  
 
The first key component of BU to be agreed was the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), 
which was proposed by the Commission in September 2012 and approved by government 
leaders at the December 2012 European Council. The compromise reached foresaw that the 
ECB would be ‘responsible for the overall effective functioning of the SSM’ and would have 
‘direct oversight of the euro area banks’ (European Council 2012a, p. 2; 2012b; 2012c). This 
supervision however would be ‘differentiated’ and the Bank would carry it out in ‘close 
cooperation with national supervisory authorities’. Direct ECB supervision (through Joint 
Supervisory Teams (JSTs)) was to cover those banks which met the following four criteria:  
one of the country’s three largest banks by assets; assets exceeding €30 billion; assets 
representing at least 20 per cent of their home country’s annual GDP, except if the bank’s 
assets amount to less than €5 billion; any other bank with a high level of cross-border 
exposure (although no precise figure was established). 
 
This paper sets out to explain national preferences on the threshold set for direct ECB 
supervision of seven northern euro area member states.1 Threshold is important because it 
concerns the degree of supranational bank supervision and thus the actual power of the ECB 
both in relation to national supervisors but also national governments. A very high bank size 
threshold (by bank assets and / or by assets as a percentage of national Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP)) would result in only the very largest banks being subject to direct ECB 
supervision. A cross-border threshold (notably, foreign held assets as a percentage of total 
bank assets) would lead to only banks with a certain level of cross-border activity being 
subject to ECB supervision. A combination of size and cross-border criteria would further 
limit the number of banks — depending on the precise levels set. Thus, threshold was about 
the reach of supranational supervision and the design of the SSM, namely the relative 
supervisory powers assigned to the ECB and to National Competent Authorities (NCAs). 
 
National preferences on the reach of the ECB’s direct control over bank supervision varied 
markedly. France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands supported direct ECB supervision over 
all euro area banks. Austria, Belgium and Finland preferred ECB supervision of only the 
largest systemically important banks. For officials from the latter three countries, preferences 
on threshold were driven — at least officially — by efficiency concerns:  they argued that it 
was impractical to extend direct ECB supervision over thousands of smaller banks given 
staffing, travel and language concerns. Such concerns were however downplayed by French, 
Luxembourgish and Dutch negotiators who called for a gradual transfer. Crucially though, 
Austrian, Belgian and Finnish negotiators were willing to compromise on this point — the 
threshold was not a deal breaker for these three countries — and all accepted the possibility of 
ECB supervision for most if not all euro area banks.2 The Austrian finance minister publicly 
																																								 																				
1	The selection of these cases is explained below. Other papers in this special edition focus 
more specifically on the negotiations on the SSM (see notably Epstein and Rhodes, this 
volume). See also Howarth and Quaglia (2013).	
2 This claim has been confirmed in interviews with a large number of national ministry of 
finance and permanent representation officials from nine different member states. While less 
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criticised the German negotiators for their stubborn position on threshold and on sheltering 
small alternative (cooperative and savings) banks from direct ECB supervision, and called for 
compromise.3 This German position aligns with longstanding government efforts to protect 
the country’s cooperative and savings bank sector from EU Commission efforts to liberalise it 
(see Deeg 1999; Smith 2001). Given the important presence of smaller alternative banks in 
five of the seven banking systems examined in this article, a more uniform preference in 
favour of a high threshold for direct ECB supervision might have been expected. In particular, 
the juxtaposition of the German, French and Austrian positions on threshold merits further 
exploration:  alternative banks held respectively 43, 43 and 50 per cent of assets in these three 
countries (central bank data). The bulk of these banks were very small institutions. 
 
Why did some national finance ministries seek to extend direct ECB supervision to many if 
not all banks, including small parochial entities, while others maintained a policy in favour of 
covering only the biggest banks regardless the actual level of their cross-border activities? 
Building on the concept of the ‘financial trilemma’ (discussed in the following section) we 
demonstrate that neither the presence of large cross-border banks nor other aggregate 
internationalization measures that might be applied explain effectively national preferences on 
threshold. Rather, we argue that the ‘reach’ of internationalization into the banking system 
best explains national policy and that this ‘reach’ should be analysed in terms of the extent to 
which smaller banks held internationalized assets but also, more importantly, the extent to 
which smaller banks were exposed to larger banks which were internationalized — 
principally through central financial institutions in consolidated or semi-consolidated groups 
and joint liability schemes. 
 
This paper contributes to three main bodies of scholarly literature. First, it adds to a small but 
growing political economy literature on financial systems — starting with Zysman’s (1983) 
pioneering work, followed by Allen and Gale (2000), Busch (2009), Deeg (2010), Hardie and 
Howarth (2013) and Hardie et al. (2013) which engage in a comparative analysis of financial 
(or specifically banking) systems. Second, the paper contributes to the (limited) comparative 
political economy literature on Varieties of Capitalism and the financial and sovereign debt 
crisis (Hall 2014) and specifically national banking systems and the recent crises (Hardie and 
Howarth 2013; Quaglia and Howarth 2013) by examining how the specific features of 
national banking systems can direct government preferences on both national and 
supranational financial regulation and supervisory frameworks. Third, this paper contributes 
to the emerging literature on the politics and political economy of Banking Union (Donnelly 
2014; Howarth and Quaglia 2013, 2014; Schimmelfennig 2014; Salines et al. 2012, 
Spendzharova 2014) which feeds into the vast literature on EMU and European economic 
governance, more generally, and national preference formation on EMU, more specifically 
(for example, Dyson 2000; Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Verdun 2000; Walsh 2000). 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																							 								
specific, several public statements by ministers and ministry officials of these three countries 
at the time of the negotiations also appear to confirm this point. 
3 ‘Talks on European banking union end in failure’, 
http://www.euronews.com/2012/12/04/talks-on-european-banking-union-end-in-failure/, 4 
December 2012; accessed 12 December 2014. 
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The material is organised as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical framework and 
research design, explaining how the dynamics created by an intensified financial trilemma in 
the context of the European Union and specifically the euro area stimulated interest in the 
SSM and other elements of Banking Union. Section 3 explains how the different reach of 
internationalization in the seven national banking systems resulted in different positions on 
the threshold to determine ECB supervision.  
 
2. Theoretical framework and research design 
 
This paper takes as its starting point Dirk Schoenmaker’s ‘financial trilemma’ (2013; 
Schoenmaker and Wagner 2011), an analytical tool created to examine the interplay of 
financial stability, international banking and national ‘financial policies’. Schoenmaker 
postulates that the minimization of financial instability in the context of cross-border banking 
requires the transfer of ‘financial policies’ (regulation, supervision, financial support and 
resolution) to the supranational level. In other words, the optimal level of supervision and 
management for large cross-border banks is at the supranational level. Cooperation among 
national officials in international supervisory colleges for large cross-border banks is sub-
optimal, especially given that control over supervision, bank bail-out and resolution remains 
at the national level. Schoenmaker focuses upon global bank governance but he dedicates a 
brief conclusion to the prospect of European Banking Union. While Schoenmaker presents an 
economic analysis to explain the existence of the trilemma, our paper applies a modified 
internationalization framework to explain national — specifically minister / ministry of 
finance — preference formation with regard to supranational bank supervision. 
 
In the context of our analysis, the presence of large banks with a significant cross-border 
presence and, more generally, banking system internationalization increased national ministry 
of finance interest in supranational supervision. In the European Union, the financial trilemma 
should also be understood in terms of specific pressures and trends created by European 
market integration, reinforced by the creation of the euro. The bulk of internationalization for 
most EU member states was within the European Union — the United Kingdom, Netherlands 
and Cyprus were the three exceptions — and this is in particular the case for our other six 
country cases (at least 80 per cent and up to 99 per cent of internationalization was to and 
from other EU member states). Six of seven the countries considered here also had significant 
exposure to Central and Eastern European member states and / or euro periphery member 
states (Table 1, see appendix) which had suffered from significant instability because of the 
international financial crisis and then sovereign debt crisis. This exposure reinforced national 
policy maker awareness of and sensitivity to the problems created by cross-border banking 
involving unstable or potentially unstable banking systems and / or economies. Our 
understanding of pertinent internationalization is thus the ‘EU internationalization’ of national 
banking systems. In the EU (and especially euro area) context, the logic of the ‘financial 
trilemma’ encouraged support for supranational supervision at the European Union level 
rather than globally — the focus of Schoenmaker’s work. We focus on EU rather than euro 
area exposure because, as confirmed in interviews, all seven member states sought the 
participation of all EU member states in Banking Union both because of single market 
concerns and because of the high level of cross-border banking throughout the EU and not 
just among euro area member states. The fragmentation of the EU financial markets — and 
notably the rapid drop in cross-border banking in the EU — in the context of the financial and 
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sovereign debt crises undermined financial stability in all member states and in particular 
created instability in the EU / euro area periphery. Clearly, this fragmentation also ran 
contrary to market integration expectations. 
 
We develop on Schoenmaker’s understanding of cross-border banking in order to better 
understand national preference formation on supranational bank supervision. Schoenmaker 
seeks to explain the contribution to international financial instability that large cross-border 
banks can make. Supranational supervision has also been explained and justified in interviews 
and public statements by ministry of finance officials in all seven of our countries on the 
grounds that large cross-border banks escaped effective supervision.4 All seven countries had 
large institutions with significant exposure to other EU member states (Table 2, see 
appendix). However, Schoenmaker’s econometric analysis and his focus upon very large, 
globally important cross-border banks only provides a limited picture of the variable of 
internationalization that created interest in supranational supervision and fails to provide an 
effective guide to national preferences on the threshold for direct ECB supervision which 
concerns the potential supervision of smaller banks. There is no correlation between the 
presence of large cross-border banks and their relative presence in the national banking 
system and national preferences on the threshold for direct ECB supervision. Thus, the highly 
concentrated Finnish banking system with two systemically important banks with a 
moderately high cross-border presence sought a very high threshold, while the highly 
concentrated Dutch banking system with three very large banks with high cross-border 
presence and the less concentrated French banking system with five systemically important 
banks with significant cross-border operations advocated direct ECB supervision of all euro 
area banks. 
 
We next consider the internationalization (exposure to other EU member states) of the entire 
banking system as an indicator of national preferences. It can be hypothesized that if overall 
internationalization levels are high than support for ECB supervision of more banks — 
beyond the largest — should be greater and, if internationalization levels are lower, the 
contrary. However, on a general internationalization index (Table 1, see appendix) there is no 
correlation with stated national preference on threshold. Thus, amongst the countries with 
lower levels of overall internationalization, France and the Netherlands supported the transfer 
of supervision of all banks to the ECB, while Austria and Germany sought a high threshold. 
Among the countries with a very high level of internationalization, two sought a high 
threshold — Belgium and Finland — but were willing to compromise, while Luxembourg 
sought full transfer to the ECB.  
 
Rather than discard internationalization as an explanatory variable, we next consider the 
‘reach’ of internationalization into the banking system to explain varying national preferences 
on the threshold for supranational supervision. If internationalization is limited to a small 
																																								 																				
4 All seven national finance ministers / ministries confirmed this logic publicly. On Wolfgang 
Schäuble’s support for ECB supervision of the biggest cross-border banks see: ‘ECB should 
only supervise big banks: Schaeuble’, in Reuters.com, 3 September 2012; available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/03/us-eurozone-banks-schaeuble-
idUSBRE88204U20120903. All our interlocutors in national financial ministries also 
confirmed this logic. 
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number of large institutions, while a large number of smaller banks are more domestically-
focused, we would expect support for a higher threshold for supranational supervision. This 
leads then to the main hypothesis tested in this paper: 
 
H:  The greater the reach of internationalization into the national banking system, the greater 
the support for direct ECB supervision of a larger number of smaller euro area banks.  
 
These smaller banks were both commercial and ‘alternative’ banks. In five of our seven 
countries, there were a large number of alternative (mostly cooperative and savings) banks.5 
These banks historically had an important social function and most continued to have a strong 
connection to a locality. This local connection had a clear political, if not politicised, 
dimension — most obviously in Germany, where local politicians continued to serve on the 
governing boards of savings banks (Ayadi et al. 2009; Bülbül et al. 2013; Simpson 2013) 
which continued to benefit from implicit guarantees of local government support. Most 
alternative banks, especially savings banks, continued to be the main lenders to Small and 
Medium Sized enterprises (SMEs) in these countries. We consider the extent to which small 
and parochial alternative banks were affected by internationalization in order to explain the 
willingness of some governments to allow them to be subject to direct ECB supervision. The 
relevant difference here owes to the structure of the alternative bank sector. In five of the 
seven countries which had a large number of small alternative banks, these banks operated 
joint liability schemes which meant that if one institution collapsed other banks would come 
to its rescue. The precise details of these schemes varied. In four of these five countries, small 
alternative banks (either cooperatives or savings banks or both) created central financial 
institutions in the context of partial or far-reaching consolidation in the 1980s and 1990s. 
These central financial institutions engaged in a larger range of commercial and investment 
banking activities than their much smaller associated banks, all engaged in significant 
international activities and, in a number of cases, were amongst the most internationalized of 
large EU banks. The structure of these part-consolidated banking groups and the 
internationalization of their central financial institutions is outlined in Table 3 (see appendix). 
Part consolidation meant that smaller banks would be subject to direct ECB supervision by 
virtue of their legal and financial relationship with the larger central financial institution, if the 
latter met the agreed threshold. Joint liability schemes created a financial commitment of a 
large number of very small and parochial banks to internationalized and systemically 
important institutions, the collapse of which would impose massive costs upon the smaller 
entities. A spectrum can be drawn between, on the one extreme, Luxembourg with only one 
																																								 																				
5 The term ‘alternative’ banks is used because these entities — mostly cooperative and 
savings banks — normally did not issue equity and were not principally, or only, profit-
oriented. Cooperative banks by definition are controlled by their depositors which became 
members with a single vote regardless their level of investment. Cooperatives pursue the 
interests of their members rather than profit-maximisation per se. The cooperative banking 
sector in all EU member states diversified over the past few decades and came to include a 
number of larger central financial institutions created to provide services to and for members 
of the smaller banks. Some of these larger institutions issued shares and operated similarly to 
commercial banks. Ayadi et al. (2009) discuss the challenge of defining a saving bank — 
created under public law, locally-rooted with a clear social function — which have also 
created central financial institutions.  
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relatively large savings bank and one medium sized cooperative bank and, on the other 
extreme, Germany with 1500 non-consolidated small alternative banks with a looser 
relationship with and financial commitment to central financial institutions. Belgium had no 
remaining cooperative and savings banks. 
 
The potential counter-argument that the level of banking system concentration was a crucial 
variable directing national preferences on the ECB threshold can be challenged. It might be 
expected that countries with low levels of concentration (more smaller banks holding more 
assets) would opt for a higher threshold while those with a higher concentration would be less 
preoccupied by threshold or deliberately seek a lower or no threshold in order to ensure 
similar ECB supervision of the different national banking systems. In particular, French 
finance ministry officials and banks regularly and publicly raised the concern during the 
negotiations that the bulk of French bank assets would be covered by ECB supervision 
whereas the figure for Germany would be much lower (Moscovici 2012; FBF 2012). The 
compromise threshold finally agreed covered bank assets ranging from 18.5 per cent in 
Luxembourg and 45 per cent in Austria to 89 per cent in France and 91 per cent in Belgium 
(Table 4, see appendix). However, concentration levels only align well with the preferences of 
two of our seven countries:  Germany and the Netherlands (see Figure 1, see appendix). Very 
low bank concentration in Austria and Luxembourg as well as Germany — 37, 33 and 33 per 
cent respectively at the end of 2012 (ECB 2013) — can be juxtaposed with very different 
national preferences on threshold. France, with only a moderate concentration level (44 per 
cent), sought no threshold while Finland and Belgium with comparatively high concentration 
levels sought a high threshold, which contradicts expectations derived from concentration 
levels. 
 
 
Research design 
 
Our analysis focuses upon the preferences of the seven northern euro area member state 
ministers / ministries of finance: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, France, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands. We examine the positions of ministers / ministries of finance because 
they were the most involved in the SSM negotiations and largely — but not entirely — 
determined national positions. The selection of finance ministries (ministers) also allows us to 
discount bureaucratic turf battles that can take / have taken place on supervision. The 
selection of these seven countries stems from their most similar position. First, unlike the 
countries of the euro periphery, their need for a successful outcome in the SSM / Banking 
Union negotiations was not acute. They were not faced with the direct menace of sovereign 
and / or bank default created by the sovereign debt crisis, although the menace of contagion of 
default in and from the euro periphery was very real. They were policy ‘makers’ while euro 
periphery countries were policy ‘takers’:  they were in a position whereby they were not 
willing to accept any supervisory solution in order to bolster confidence. The finance 
ministers of all seven countries also had explicit / publicly stated moral hazard concerns with 
regard to European funds to be created to support sovereigns and banks.6 Such concerns 
																																								 																				
6 For example, see ‘Finnish Finance Minister opposes joint liability bank union’, Reuters.com, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/06/13/finland-urpilainen-idUKH7E8FC02H20120613, 13 
June 2012; accessed 4 January 2015. 
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demonstrate that they imposed clear limits on their support for Banking Union despite the 
menace of the sovereign debt crisis. 
 
During the 2012 negotiations, all seven finance ministers accepted the need for the SSM — 
although the German finance minister did so with considerable reluctance. German insistence 
on treaty reform to create the SSM was widely interpreted as a delay tactic to push the project 
to a distant future (Financial Times 10 October 2012; Financial Times, 5 December 2012).7 
As substantiated in the empirical analysis below — notably with reference to bank position 
papers to the Commission’s consultation on the SSM — the preferences of national finance 
ministries were aligned closely with the dominant preferences of their national banking sector. 
In all seven countries, the fit is very close. The ambivalence of the German position on the 
SSM reflects the divisions in the country’s three-pillared banking system. However, despite a 
similarly differentiated banking sector in Austria, the positions of both Austrian alternative 
banks and the country’s ministry of finance on the SSM was more positive. We will show 
how the structure of the Austrian alternative banks helps to explain Austrian willingness to 
negotiate on the SSM threshold.  
 
Methodologically, this paper deploys a two-step political economy analysis. First, it examines 
the internationalization patterns of national banking systems. Second, this paper examines 
how these systemic features shaped policy maker preferences on the SSM. This is done 
through textual analysis of government policy documents and bank and banking association 
position papers, a systematic survey of press coverage and semi-structured elite interviews 
with policy makers across the EU, notably from the seven national ministries of finance, 
national supervisory bodies and national permanent representations to the EU in Brussels. 
 
European banking systems and the reach of internationalization 
 
Austria 
In the two countries with a mixed system of both semi-consolidated alternative banks and 
small independent entities (Austria and Finland) a nuanced policy on threshold was adopted. 
Both supported a high threshold but expressed willingness to negotiate (on Austria see Ayadi 
et al. 2009; Bülbül et al. 2013; Fonteyne 2007). In Austria, where hundreds of semi-
consolidated cooperatives and savings banks were built around and in a joint liability 
arrangement with two of the most internationalized banks in Europe (Volksbanken and Erste) 
with massive exposure to central, eastern and south-eastern European economies, there was 
clear interest in supranational banking supervision to gain greater control over the supervision 
of these groups (interview, Austrian Ministry of Finance official, 12 June 2015). The Austrian 
savings bank system was officially a federation where small members maintained 
considerable autonomy. However, with both assets and a range of activities concentrated in 
Erste bank — a savings bank hybrid partly owned by private investors — some authors have 
described it as closer to a group of companies (Ayadi et al. 2009). A significant number of 
smaller alternative banks also engaged in significant cross-border operations, notably through 
branches in areas bordering on Austria. Opposition to ECB supervision which was present in 
																																								 																				
7 The expert officials in the other eight finance ministries and / or permanent representations 
interviewed for this paper interpreted the German position on necessary Treaty reform as a 
delay tactic designed to push the move to SSM to a long-term future. 
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both a range of cooperatives and savings banks was effectively sidelined within the 
federations (interviews with Erste bank officials, 16 June 2015). The ideal scenario for the 
Austrian finance ministry was that central and eastern European countries would join the 
SSM. However, even if they remained non-members, the assumption of Austrian authorities 
was that the ECB would have — as the dominant actor and lead supervisor in supervisory 
colleges — considerable influence over supervisors of subsidiaries of these big Austrian 
banks in neighbouring countries (interview, Austrian Ministry of Finance official, 12 June 
2015). At the same time, a large number of small cooperative banks in Austria — about a 
third, holding about five per cent of total Austrian banks assets — remained independent of 
any semi-consolidated group and largely, if not entirely, parochial in their focus. Austrian 
opposition to direct ECB supervision of all banks stemmed from an interest in sheltering these 
institutions on the grounds that that national officials knew best how to supervise them and 
apply to them a complex regulatory framework that maintained distinct provisions for 
commercial, cooperative and savings banks (interview, Austrian Ministry of Finance official, 
12 June 2015). 
 
Belgium 
The high internationalization figure for the Belgian banking system suggests interest in the 
SSM. Notably, the Belgium government had an interest in the effective supervision of the two 
largest banks in the country (BNP Fortis and ING), which were subsidiaries of very large 
French and Dutch banks, as well as of the only remaining large Belgian bank, KBC, which 
was heavily exposed to central and eastern European countries (interview, National Bank of 
Belgium officials, 3 June 2015). The devastation of the financial crisis and the difficult 
intergovernmental negotiations on the resolution of two of the country’s largest banks loomed 
large for Belgian policy makers. There were no remaining cooperative or savings banks in 
Belgium — the cooperative banks collapsed in the 1990s and the savings banks had been 
taken over by private banks — and only one medium-sized commercial bank had a 
cooperative banking operation created to expand retail market share (Ayadi et al. 2009). At 
the same time, Belgium was also host to a large number of foreign bank subsidiaries and 
branches — many of which set up operations in Belgium specifically to take advantage of the 
low tax regime on savings accounts — which collectively held 65 per cent of the country’s 
bank assets at the end of 2012 (ECB 2013). The Belgian ministry of finance pushed for a high 
threshold for direct ECB supervision for efficiency reasons. However, Belgian policy makers 
noted their flexibility on threshold (interviews, Belgian Federal Ministry of Finance, Central 
Bank and Permanent Representation to the EU, 2, 4 and 5 June 2015), especially given that a 
lower threshold could help to improve the control of the range of smaller subsidiaries of 
foreign banks operating in Belgium (interviews, National Bank of Belgium officials, 2 and 3 
June 2015).  
 
Finland 
Internationalization in Finland came principally in the form of the dominant presence of the 
Swedish bank Nordea which held approximately two-thirds of Finnish bank assets. For the 
IMF (2014) there was a clear logic for Finnish authorities to accept Banking Union — ideally 
with Sweden in but also with it out — to ensure better control over the consolidated group and 
decrease the chance of Nordea activities that could be detrimental to the Finnish economy 
(notably potential ring-fencing of capital). Nordea had also outsourced nearly all of its 
derivatives activities to its Finnish subsidiary. The Finnish banking sector was thus 
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excessively reliant on a subsidiary of a single foreign bank which held a disproportionately 
high level of higher risk-weighted assets. The international presence of the second largest 
bank (Op Pohjola) was significant (18 per cent of assets in the EU) but principally in other 
Nordic countries. As the main supervisor for a number of Nordea subsidiaries in SSM 
participating countries, the ECB was set to have a significant presence in the bank’s 
supervisory college. This ECB presence was seen as inherently desirable to Finnish 
authorities (IMF 2014; interviews) even if this meant an end to a formal Finnish presence in 
the Nordea supervisory college. Given, the very heavy concentration of the Finnish banking 
sector, Finnish support for ECB supervision of only the very largest Finnish entities — and in 
fact only Nordea — made sense. However, the Finns accepted compromise on threshold, 
notably the inclusion of the three bank minimum. The threshold agreed would cover the 
Dansk bank subsidiary which, although less than a tenth the size of Nordea, had a massive 
international presence of over 60 per cent of assets (principally back to Denmark). However, 
the threshold agreed would also result in covering the country’s second largest bank, the semi-
consolidated group of cooperative banks (Op Pohjola).   
 
As in Austria, there was a major division in the Finnish cooperative bank sector. About two-
thirds of all cooperatives, holding roughly 20 per cent of the country’s bank assets, were in a 
centralized semi-consolidated arrangement with joint liability with a large commercial bank 
created by the cooperatives in the 1990s (OP Pohjola) with significant international activities 
as noted above (see also Fonteyne 2007). As in Austria, there remained a significant number 
of independent cooperatives (about a third) with a purely local focus. Finnish Ministry of 
Finance officials saw ECB supervision of these smaller and locally-focused entities as 
problematic (interviews with Finnish authorities, 7 and 18 June, 2015) and preferred not to 
assign full supervisory powers to the ECB in order to shelter this sector from ECB 
supervision. The differential treatment of national cooperatives was also a cause for concern, 
particularly for Op Pohjola (interviews, Op Pohjola official, 11 June, 2015; Finnish 
authorities, 7 June 2015). The small savings bank group was organised similarly to Op 
Pohjola, with a joint liability scheme among small regional and local banks and also with a 
central financial institution (the SB Central Bank), that was, at the end of 2012, very small 
and with minimal international exposure. The ministry of finance hoped to shelter these small 
savings banks from direct ECB supervision (interview, Finnish Ministry of Finance official, 
17 June 2015). 
 
France 
In accordance with the financial trilemma, French interest in supranational supervision was 
sparked by the internationalization of the five largest French banks which all held a 
significant percentage of the assets in other EU member states and in the euro periphery 
specifically (Howarth 2013). However, the low aggregate internationalization and moderate 
concentration figures for the French banking system appear to contradict French ministry of 
finance preference on the transfer of all bank supervision to the ECB (Table 1; Figure 1, see 
appendix). French preferences can be explained in terms of the semi-consolidated nature of 
French cooperative banks which meant that even with a relatively high threshold, a very high 
percentage of French bank assets would likely be subject to direct ECB supervision.  
 
All French cooperatives were in one of three large centralized semi-consolidated groups, in 
which small banks advertised as distinct entities at the local and regional level but had very 
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limited autonomy from the mother bank. The central institutions and, in the case of the part-
listed Crédit Agricole and Banques Populaires et Caisses d’Epargne (BPCE), specially created 
investment banks (Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Banks (CACIB) and Natixis), 
were highly internationalised. The international financial crisis resulted in significant losses 
from derivatives trading by both these investment banks and the central institutions (Howarth 
2013). The one partial exception was Crédit Mutuel which nonetheless still held a significant 
percentage of its assets (14 per cent) outside of France.  
 
The French ministry of finance, the main peak banking association and a number of individual 
French banks expressed concern over the unequal treatment of member states given the size 
of the five largest French institutions which would all likely end up being directly supervised 
by the ECB (Financial Times, 14 November 2012; FBF 2012; Crédit Agricole 2014). In 
addition to ‘fairness’ concerns, the French government and banks also argued that the division 
into larger and smaller banks made little economic sense, given that banking crises often 
originated with smaller, fast-expanding banks (FBF 2012). French opposition to differential 
treatment also reflects French government insistence of a lack of a ‘too big to fail’ problem 
facing the large French banks given their ‘mixed business’ model and a longstanding strategy 
of constructing national champions engaged in a range of banking activities (Howarth 2013). 
The three largest alternative banking groups in France — Crédit Mutuel and BPCE (a 
federation of cooperative and former savings banks) and Crédit Agricole — also expressed 
concerns about direct ECB supervision, given their funding structure, but not outright 
opposition (Crédit Agricole 2014). Overall though, French government preference in favour 
of direct ECB supervision of all euro area banks was flexible. France was one of the main 
member state drivers behind Banking Union and the SSM and President François Holland 
placed great emphasis on the rapid construction of the SSM (see Donnelly 2014, Howarth and 
Quaglia 2013; Moscovici 2012; interviews with German policy makers 30 October 2014, 
interviews with Commission officials 13-14 November 2014).8 
 
Germany 
Unlike France, the German position on the threshold for direct ECB supervision corresponded 
closely to both aggregate figures on internationalization and concentration (Table 1; Figure 1, 
see appendix). The German financial ministry consistently supported ECB direct supervision 
of the country’s two largest commercial banks, both with a very high international presence 
— Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank (Financial Times 5 December 2012; interviews BaFin 
official, Berlin, 30 October 2014). These two banks were also themselves strongly in favour 
of their direct supervision by the ECB which would also simplify the supervision of their 
numerous subsidiaries in the euro area (Deutsche Bank 2012 & 2013; Bloomberg 2012). 
Ministry of Finance opposition to lowering the supervision threshold also aligned with the 
position of associations representing the publicly owned Landesbanks and savings banks (the 
VOB) and Cooperatives (the BVR) which were clear in their opposition to the extension of 
direct ECB supervision to smaller German banks (BVR/VÖB/DSGV 2012; Financial Times, 
9 September 2012; Financial Times 2 December 2012). In the meantime, Deutsche Bank and 
Commerzbank actively supported direct ECB supervision of all euro area banks in order to 
																																								 																				
8 See ‘Europe nears deal to make ECB chief bank watchdog’, Reuters.com; available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/12/us-eu-banking- idUSBRE8BB00820121212; 
accessed on 2 December 2014. 
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avoid the differential treatment of bank supervision (Deutsche Bank 2012 & 2013; Bloomberg 
2012). 
 
Determined German ministry of finance opposition to extending ECB direct supervision 
beyond the largest banks also reflects the limited reach of internationalization into the German 
banking system.9 Despite waves of consolidation that had more than halved their total number 
since the 1950s, by the end of 2012 there were still 1104 very small to small cooperative 
banks and 423 saving banks in Germany (Bülbül et al. 2013). Collectively, the smaller 
cooperative and savings banks (excluding central institutions) held 22 per cent of total assets. 
In late 2012, the largest saving bank had a balance sheet of approximately €40bn — about 
one-fiftieth that of Deutsche Bank — and more than 100 had less than a billion euros in assets 
(Bundesbank statistics; Financial Times, 2 December 2012). Cooperatives were even smaller 
on average. However, their role in the German economy was far greater than their balance 
sheet size would suggest. Small cooperative and savings banks provided, respectively, 13 and 
21 per cent of loans to non financial companies in Germany and held, respectively, 16 and 24 
per cent of the country’s bank deposits (Bundesbank, end 2012 figures). With associated 
institutions, German alternative banks held 40 per cent of total assets and provided 51 per cent 
of lending to non financial companies. 
 
The cooperative banks included two central financial institutions — DZ-Bank and WGZ-
Bank and a number of specialized service providers — for example, a large building society 
(Bausparkasse Schwäbisch-Hall) and an asset management company (Union Investment) — 
operating nationwide. DZ-Bank, the fourth largest bank in Germany at the end of 2012, also 
operated as a commercial bank and had a significant international presence (21 per cent in the 
EU and a total of 27 per cent internationally). It was very likely to be covered by direct ECB 
supervision. However, the cooperatives’ joint liability scheme did not cover these larger 
institutions and, with the exception of DZ-Bank, their focus was overwhelmingly domestic. 
The absence of a joint liability scheme that included these much larger entities stands in 
marked distinction to the Austrian cooperative banks and their highly internationalized mother 
institution (Fonteyne 2007).  
 
Savings banks maintained joint liability schemes but only with other small, locally focused 
entities. Importantly, they had a reputation for being financially stable banks — none had to 
																																								 																				
9 The German government’s willingness to compromise on the inclusion of the DZ-Bank (the 
central financial institution to the cooperative banks) and the Landesbanks in the remit of 
direct ECB supervision is beyond the remit of this paper and involved a range of 
considerations. However, the decision to lower the threshold sufficiently to include these 
banks confirms the internationalization argument presented in this paper in that DZ-Bank and 
the Landesbanks all held a significant percentage of their assets in other EU member states. 
The damage caused to some Landesbanks during the financial crisis, large government bail-
outs, Commission-imposed restructuring and stagnant lending placed them in a politically 
weakened position (Deeg and Donnelly, this volume). German federal governments and the 
Bundesbank have long called for the consolidation of banks in this sector (Hardie and 
Howarth 2009; 2013; Financial Times 14 September 2010). Clearly, the German preference 
to extend ECB direct supervision to the unstable Spanish cajas also encouraged compromise. 
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be bailed out by governments since the 1950s. The savings banks in certain regions had ties to 
regional Landesbanks, some of which had a strong international presence, notably LB Baden-
Württemberg. However, as with the cooperatives, there were no joint liability schemes that 
bound the savings banks to Landesbanks. Rather many savings banks contributed to 
Landesbank funding and benefitted from some of their services. Alone in Europe, German 
cooperatives and savings banks formally maintained the regional principle, which blocked 
competition among cooperatives and savings banks respectively and maintained local 
fiefdoms (Ayadi et al. 2009; Bülbül et al. 2013). German savings banks had a vested interest 
in the local economy and a strong presence in local community life. Local politicians sat on 
bank boards. Savings bank directors appeared to be unanimous in their view that home 
regulators and supervisors better understood their characteristics and way of doing business 
(Simpson 2013; Financial Times, 2 December 2012). The close connections between the 
savings bank and local and other German politicians encouraged federal government support 
for the protection of existing practices and the policy of extending direct ECB supervision to 
only systemically important banks.   
 
Luxembourg 
Luxembourg was, by a significant margin, the most internationalized of the seven banking 
systems both in and out and it was also the country where the reach of internationalization 
was the greatest.  The very large majority of the more than 140 banks in the country — all but 
three of which were subsidiaries or branches of foreign headquartered banks — had 
significant international presence. At the same time, many of these subsidiaries were not very 
large which explains why Luxembourg authorities pushed actively for a low threshold and, 
ideally, the transfer to the ECB of supervisory powers over all banks. Ironically, Luxembourg 
finished up as the country with the lowest percentage of bank assets covered by the agreed 
ECB threshold. Luxembourg’s largest home-headquartered bank was a savings bank — the 
Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat (BCEE) — owned by the Luxembourg state. The single 
cooperative bank (Raiffeisen), was of moderate size (assets of approximately €6 billion in 
2012) and had negligible international assets. The BCEE was, however, an unusual savings 
bank — more similar to Erste bank in Austria — in that it also had a very high presence of 34 
per cent of its assets in other EU member states. For Luxembourg ministry of finance 
officials, the significant reach of internationalisation into the national banking system 
demonstrated clearly that ECB direct supervision of all these entities ‘could significantly 
improve their supervision’ (interviews 24 February 2014). For EU-headquartered banks, the 
ECB would lead and dominate their supervisory colleges. 
 
Netherlands 
The highly consolidated nature of the Dutch banking system and the high internationalization 
of the three largest banks created a very strong interest in supranational supervision. 
Netherlands was home to two of the world’s 30 largest banks (by asset size) (ING and 
Rabobank) and a third very large bank that had previously been one of the world’s largest 
(ABN). All the small and locally focused Dutch cooperative banks (Raiffeisen) formed part of 
a semi-consolidated group and participated in a joint liability scheme with a ‘mother bank’ 
(Rabobank) with a very strong international presence. Dutch savings banks had merged 
decades earlier and operated as a standard commercial retail bank. The Dutch finance ministry 
supported direct ECB supervision of all euro area banks which was presented, as in France, as 
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the best way to even out ECB supervisory control among the different member states 
(Netherlands Government 2012; Dutch ministry of finance interview, 22 June 2015).  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has examined the manner in which internationalization patterns shaped national 
preferences on the threshold of ECB direct supervision. Controlling the principal providers of 
credit to the real economy was an important policy making power of national competent 
authorities. The transfer of this power to the supranational level could only ever have been 
achieved in exceptional circumstances — which the sovereign debt crisis created. For 
economists, the logic behind a move to supranational supervision was that national control of 
large (‘systemically important’) cross-border banks was bound to be sub-optimal. This paper 
demonstrates that this economic logic fails to explain most national preferences on the 
transfer of supervisory powers to the ECB and the actual transfer that took place — which 
covered a large number of banks with minimal international presence, including some very 
small parochial institutions, including alternative banks, focused entirely on traditional 
banking activities and the local economy. It is necessary then to consider the 
internationalization of the entire banking system both out — the international exposure of 
national banks — and in — the foreign bank presence in the banking system. We focus 
specifically on exposure to and from other EU member states on the grounds that it dominated 
the internationalization of the seven national banking systems that we consider and because 
this is the internationalization which the SSM was created better to manage. There were 
significant differences in the internationalization patterns of the seven countries studied in our 
paper. Four of the countries — Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands — were 
dominated overwhelmingly (more than 80 per cent) by national banks but these banks also 
had a very a large presence through subsidiaries in other EU member states. Belgium, Finland 
and Luxembourg had banking systems with a major foreign (mostly other EU) bank presence 
but these foreign-owned subsidiaries (and the biggest national banks) also had a significant 
presence in other EU member states. The largest foreign bank subsidiaries in all three 
countries would be (if they met the threshold) subject to direct ECB supervision. 
 
However, aggregate internationalization figures provide only limited guidance as to national 
preferences. In six of our seven case study countries is necessary to consider the reach of 
internationalization and the extent to which even small institutions were exposed to 
international banking. In the case of Luxembourg, the large number of small but 
internationalised institutions explained national support for a low threshold for direct ECB 
supervision or none at all. In the case of the five countries with a large alternative banking 
sector — where the large majority of small banks were cooperatives and / or savings banks, 
where many or most of these banks were in consolidated or semi-consolidated groups with 
joint-liability schemes that exposed them directly to much larger internationalized institutions 
— the logic of sheltering smaller banks from supranational supervision was eliminated. 
Although German alternative banks were in a similar structure, with large central financial 
institutions, attached entities and tied Landesbanks engaged in a range of international 
banking activities, Germany was the only country where joint liability schemes covered only 
smaller institutions. These institutions were thus sheltered from international operations and 
the econometric logic of supranational supervision did not apply. Independent cooperative 
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banks in Austria and Finland were similarly sheltered but in both countries they formed a 
minority of cooperative banks. In terms of the position of the banks themselves, larger 
institutions in all seven countries supported the transfer to the ECB of supervisory powers 
over all banks in participating countries. The largest banks in all seven countries uniformly 
opposed uneven supervision. They feared that they would be subject to a stricter ECB control 
while smaller institutions continued to benefit from a national supervision that was potentially 
more favourable and informed by specific local concerns and, thus, benefit potentially from 
supervisory forbearance.  
 
The reluctance of smaller alternative banks in Austria, Finland, France and the Netherlands to 
accept the potential extension of direct ECB supervision to even the smaller entities of semi-
consolidated banks, was sidelined by the support from much larger mother banks (central 
financial institutions) with a stronger international presence. Only in Germany did the 
representative associations for the cooperatives and savings banks succeed in presenting a 
strong opposition to the extension of ECB supervision to all banks — a line also presented by 
the independent Finnish and Austrian cooperative and savings banks. This paper has argued 
that national ministries of finance largely followed a structural logic in the determination of 
their national preferences on the SSM: ranging from stubborn German opposition to the 
extension of direction ECB supervision to any but the largest banks, to softer Austrian, 
Finnish and Belgian support for a high threshold, and French, Dutch and Luxembourgish 
support for a complete transfer of supervisory powers. 
 
This political economy analysis contributes to the academic literature in two ways. It 
complements academic accounts that focus on the political negotiations on BU, at the EU 
level or domestically, by explaining why national finance ministries and different parts of the 
financial industry had the preferences they had. It outlines the different internationalization 
patterns of seven national banking systems in the EU in order to explain preferences on the 
SSM and BU. Despite more than sixty years of financial integration in the EU and significant 
strides forward in the single financial market in recent years, national banking systems 
remained very distinct, complicating the negotiations on the SSM and ensuring the persistence 
of national variation in supervisory practice.  
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Appendix:  Tables and Figure 
 
Table 1: European Union exposure of national banking systems (assets as a percentage of total 
bank assets) (end 2012) 
 EU in EU out EU Total 
(in + out) 
EU Periphery 
out (Southern 
Europe and + 
CEEC) 
Exposure to At-Risk 
countries (euro 
periphery) as per 
cent of bank risk-
weighted assets* 
Austria 16.4 15 32.4 13.2 10 
Belgium 50 23 73 14.6 36.4 
Finland 66.2 1.8 68 2.3 5.6 
France 10.1 14.7 24.8 8.2 21.9 
Germany 11.8 7.2 19 7.4 25.9 
Luxembourg 78.2 71.2 149.4 16.3 28.5 
Netherlands 9.9 10.3 20.2 4.8 13.6 
Sources for EU in:  national central bank data bases. Sources for EU Consolidated foreign claims of 
reporting banks - immediate borrower basis: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), ECB statistical 
warehouse, European Banking Authority, EU Capital Exercise.  The euro periphery includes Italy, 
Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks - immediate 
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borrower basis EU in from EU banking structures 2013. EU out includes assets held in the EU of all 
banks (including subsidiaries of foreign banks). 
*December 2011 figures. 
 
Table 2:  Internationalization of large banks*, end 2012 (per cent of total bank assets; rounded 
figures) 
 European Union Rest of World 
Austria   
Erste 56 3 
Volksbank 48 4 
Raiffeisenlandesbank 16 0 
Bank of Austria (UniCredit) 50 1.8 
Belgium   
KBC Group 21 15 
BNP Fortis 16 4 
ING Bel. 23 9 
Finland   
Nordea Fin. 9 1 
Dansk Fin. 43 4 
OP Pohjala 18 3 
France   
BNP Paribas 34 17 
Société Générale 12 9 
Crédit Agricole 11 8 
CACIB 30 41 
BPCE 14 15 
Natixis 21 22 
Crédit Mutuel 10 4 
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Germany   
Deutsche Bank 32 34 
Commerzbank 17 32 
Landesbank BW 20 8 
Landesbank Bayerische 12 11 
DZ Bank 21 6 
Luxembourg   
BCEE 34 1 
BNP-BGL 63 4 
Netherlands   
Ing 22 38 
ABN 12 8 
Rabobank 9 17 
*Those linked to alternative banks in bold. 
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Table 3: The institutional position of alternative banks and the  internationalization of their 
central financial institutions 
Country Alternative 
bank assets 
as a 
percentage of 
total bank 
assets (end 
2011) 
Institutional position EU exposure of 
central financial 
institution and 
linked investment 
banks 
National 
preference on 
ECB supervision 
Austria 51 Federation with bank 
autonomy but 
increasingly 
centralized and subject 
to joint liability 
schemes. Only a third 
of cooperatives 
remained independent 
entities (with a joint 
liability scheme in 
place). 
Very high. Erste: 56 
per cent. 
Volksbanken:  57 per 
cent of assets. 
Only largest 
(including large 
alternative banks).  
Belgium N/A No remaining savings 
banks and 
cooperatives. 
N/A Only largest.  
Finland 21 Two-thirds in a 
centralized semi-
consolidated 
relationship with a 
large mother bank. A 
third of cooperatives 
remained independent 
entities (non-
consolidated) with no 
joint-liability scheme. 
Very small savings 
bank network. 
Moderate. Op 
Pohjola: 18 per cent 
exposure to EU. 
Only Nordea 
(largest) ideally; 
willing to include 
Op Pohjola.  
France 43 Consolidated, very 
limited autonomy of 
members.  Savings 
Moderate to 
moderately high. 
Crédit Mutuel 10 per 
All. 
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banks and cooperative 
banks federated into 
large entities. Very 
few independent 
alternative banks. 
cent. Crédit Agricole 
11 per cent.  BPCE 
high 14 per cent (29 
per cent 
international). 
CACIB 30 per cent 
(71 per cent 
international). Natixis 
21 per cent (43 
international). 
Germany 43 Autonomous entities 
in joint liability and 
supervisory schemes. 
Central financial 
institutions created but 
without joint liability 
with smaller entities. 
DZ Bank at 21 per 
cent (but no joint 
liability with 
cooperatives). 
Landesbanks range 
from 8 to 20 per cent 
(but no joint liability 
with savings banks). 
Largest only. Very 
reluctant to 
compromise. 
Luxembourg 15 No smaller alternative 
banks (measured by 
assets as a percentage 
of total assets). One 
single large savings 
bank and a single 
medium sized 
Raiffeisen (agricultural 
cooperative). 
BCEE very high at 35 
per cent. 
 
All. 
Netherlands 31 Centralized and Semi-
Consolidated. 129 
small Cooperative 
Rabobank banks (at 
end 2012) under a 
Central Rabobank with 
joint liability.   
Coöperatieve 
Centrale Raiffeisen-
Boerenleenbank 
(Rabobank) high at 
18 per cent (38 per 
cent international). 
All. 
This list of alternative banks includes only cooperatives and savings banks; it does not include a range 
of public and semi-public banks or banks (e.g. Post office and municipal banks). 
 
 
 
 
 
	 24	
 
 
Table 4: Banks subject to direct ECB supervision (end 2012 figures) 
 All 
banks 
Banks directly 
supervised by the 
ECB* 
Banks directly supervised by the ECB 
(percentage of total bank assets) 
Austria 678 8 45.3 
Belgium 16 7 91.1 
Finland 193 3 79.5 
France 18 10 89.1 
Germany 1682 21 68.9 
Luxembourg 146 5 18.5 
Netherlands 91 7 88.5 
Source: European Parliament (2014).  *2014 decision based on end 2013 data. 
 
Figure 1: Banking system concentration* (end 2012) 
 
Source:  ECB (2013) Banking Structures Report; *Share of the largest five banking institutions as a 
percentage of total assets. 
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